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ABSTRACT: 
 
The internet has the capacity to facilitate the creation of new 
forms of civic engagement, but the realisation of these 
opportunities requires institutional and cultural reinforcement. 
The democratic character of e-citizenship and the equal 
distribution of online resources to the public require the 
fulfilment of four conditions: access, engagement (incorporating 
education, motivation and trust), meaningful deliberation and a 
link between civic input and public policy output. Furthermore, 
the gap between the main features of cyberspace and the 
inherent prerequisites of democracy, such as a finite space and a 
set of rules, create tensions that need to be negotiated 
politically. Although the empirical evidence available includes 
some encouraging signs regarding the future use of the internet 
for civic engagement, the existing limitations and obstacles 
mean that the new media will complement, rather than replace, 
the old media as a democratic public sphere. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: BRIDGING THE GAPS 
 
Liberal democracies are allegedly facing a crisis of systemic 
legitimacy and public trust. Voter turnout is only one of many 
democratic functions being affected. Other symptoms are the 
breakdown of communities and the decline of social capital [1], 
the dumbing down of political information [2], the patterns of 
conflict and dependence between politicians and journalists [3], 
[4] and the lack of public trust in political institutions and 
processes [5], [6]. The apparent decline in the political culture 
has significant implications both at the philosophical / ethical 
levels (legitimisation) and at the practical one (quality of life).  
 
In addition to this set of trends, there is an emerging gap 
between governance and citizenship, i.e. between power-holders 
and power-givers. In recent decades, power has moved away 
from the nation-state towards multi-level governance, whereas 
the political rhetoric and the institutional voice of citizens 
remain tied up to the nation state [7]. The agenda of the 21st 
century politics includes a new set of issues and problems that 
cut across nation states, such as war and international terrorism, 
environmental destruction of a global scale, immigration and 
asylum, genetics and biotechnology, privacy and intellectual 
property rights. Individual governments seem unable to tackle 
these issues on their own, which has led to the creation of 
complex networks of policy-making. Several scholars have 
asked for the extension of the national citizenship to the 
international domain [8], [9]. At the moment this seems to be an 
unlikely - and perhaps an unfeasible - project. 
 
The existence and evolution of democracy requires a finite 
space within which issues are discussed and decisions are made. 
Given the role of the media as such an arena for the mass 
political process, there has been an extended discussion on their 
potential effect. The media have been recently accused of 
leading to social isolation and alienation, promoting negativity, 
image and conflict over substance and consensus, placing 
considerable public power on corporate hands, and undermining 
democracy [10]. Other scholars, such as Norris, have presented 
evidence of a virtuous relationship between media coverage of 
political information and civic engagement [11] and have raised 
doubts about the corrosive effect of the media on social capital. 
Journalists can be seen as scrutinising political leaders, making 
information accessible to the lay citizen and bringing up civic 
concerns. 
 
Due to the revolution of communication's scale and speed 
facilitated by new technologies, the debate between optimists 
and pessimists is magnified when it comes to assessing the 
impact of the new media on democracy. The discourse over e-
democracy has traditionally taken place within two oppositions, 
the conflicting visions of optimists and pessimists (or 'utopias' 
and 'dystopias' [12]) and the conflicting explanations of 
technological determinists (incorporating both previous groups) 
and proponents of the 'reinforcement' model. As it has been 
argued elsewhere [13], the quest for a blanket effect and/or a 
unique source of change is a fruitless enterprise. The distinction 
between technology and human agency (comprising of socio-
cultural and psychological components) is to a large extent 
artificial; both elements affect each other in an organic cycle of 
interaction. Therefore, scholars and politicians should focus on 
identifying and developing the necessary institutional, cultural 
and technological means that will make the most of the 
opportunities, and tackle the challenges, presented by 
technology. The internet can enhance citizenship and 
democracy, but positive evolution is not part of the hardware or 
software - it needs to be facilitated. 
 
From a review of the recent literature, four discrete obstacles 
emerge that restrain the ability of new ICTs to enhance 
citizenship: access, engagement, meaningful deliberation and 
impact on public policy. The analysis presented here concurs 
with Kurland and Egan's 'three fundamental characteristics' 
(access, voice and dialogue) [14] although it builds on that by 
considering recent empirical evidence and also by presenting 
engagement and impact on public policy as conditions on their 
own merit. 
 
 
2. ACCESS 
 
Entry into the political space within which citizens contribute to 
the political debate and the decision-making process (whether 
we call that civil society, public sphere or cyberspace) is 
paramount. Access to the new information and communication 
technologies is for e-democracy what the right to vote has been 
for electoral politics. Hence, the digital divide is surely one of 
the biggest hurdles facing the effective use of the internet for 
civic participation in the democratic process. According to 
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Norris [15] the gap between information-rich and information-
poor citizens has been reinforced in the online world. There is a 
consensus that well-educated, affluent, young males are 
disproportionately represented in the population of internet 
users [16], [17]. 
 
The fact that the younger generations are overall more digitally 
literate is encouraging because it gives them a platform for the 
development of their culture and identities. Furthermore, new 
technologies facilitate civic access and social networking for 
population groups that are currently excluded by the process, 
either due to physical constraints (such as a disability) or 
because of lack of resources (time, money, etc). However, if we 
consider information technology as a tool of empowerment then 
the fact that this resource is not evenly spread across the 
population weakens its democratic potential. More importantly, 
that inequality is not random; it is particularly evident amongst 
specific segments of the population, which could create new 
forms of social exclusion. 
 
An additional parameter to this problem is the global nature of 
cyberspace and the gap between information-rich and 
information-poor countries. If the lack of access can create 
inequalities within national public spheres, it can also widen the 
gap amongst nations. Given the cross-national nature of 
emerging problems mentioned above, and the need for policy-
making at the international level, the effect can obtain an extra 
dimension. Therefore, it could be argued that, because of its 
vital importance for the universal character of e-democracy, 
access (or the right to access) needs to be reinforced 
institutionally and politically. As scholars have mentioned, this 
is not just an issue of technological applications, but also a 
matter of digital literacy and culture.  
 
 
3. ENGAGEMENT 
 
Obtaining access to the Internet does not mean that there will be 
a positive effect on democracy. Even if there were guaranteed 
universal access to the new technologies, the next hurdle would 
be the citizens' engagement with the political process. 
'Engagement' is an umbrella term that comprises of several 
elements. The first one is motivation: not all individuals are 
interested in politics, especially considering the continuously 
negative and adversary coverage of political leaders and 
processes, which according to several scholars has created a 
culture of non-participation. Additionally, not all individuals are 
politically educated enough to feel that they can participate 
meaningfully in processes of democratic deliberation, 
preference measurement or civic mobilisation. Given the 
complexity and scale of modern policy-making, it is impossible 
to have an informed opinion about every issue in the political 
agenda and to also have the time and motivation to express and 
negotiate it. 
 
Another very important factor that has a cyclical relationship to 
engagement is trust: mistrust breeds disengagement (and vice 
versa); and, also, trust breeds engagement (and vice versa) in a 
virtuous circle of social capital [18]. As Smith [19] has shown 
social capital in the early stages of life leads to political 
socialisation, which in turn leads to civic engagement. 
Politically relevant social capital itself is created through 
personal networks and social exchanges, as La Due Lake and 
Huckfeldt have shown [20]. In short, social interactions with 
other individuals eventually lead to greater civic participation. 
The internet has been accused of causing social isolation and 
mistrust, and therefore of aggravating civic disengagement. 
However, Uslaner argues that trust is a variable independent of 
the internet. Taking a 'reinforcement' approach, he argues that 
"Internet usage does not destroy trust, but it doesn't create trust 
either. No matter what you do on-line, you don't become more 
(or less) trusting… Trusting people are also no more or less 
likely to go on-line more than misanthropes" [21].  
 
However, that argument may not take into account the fact that, 
provided that more children and young people continue to go 
online, and considering generational replacement, the internet 
may have a long term effect on people's (overall) trust levels. 
That is to say, although the levels of trust in today's adults may 
not be directly affected by technology, increased (virtual) 
interaction in adolescence and young adulthood in the future 
might lead to a different kind of socialisation, and subsequently 
to a different kind of civic engagement.  
 
Although it is too early for a conclusive assessment of these 
issues, new technological applications force us to 'think out of 
the box' when it comes to evaluating political participation. It is 
a common pitfall to assess online citizenship and online civic 
engagement using 'offline' measures (such as voting intentions, 
party memberships etc). However, the internet could well 
facilitate the creation of totally different forms of civic 
engagement or civic culture that so far had been unfeasible. 
Moreover, recent evidence [22] indicates the development of an 
online youth civic culture expressed through awareness, 
volunteering, campaigning and the public exercise of voice. 
 
Unless one adopts an approach of pure biological determinism, 
and accepts the influence of socio-cultural factors, it can be 
argued that trust can be 'constructed'. If the system can 
manufacture mistrust, it should also be able to manufacture 
trust. Another question arises then, which is whether unqualified 
trust in institutions is welcome. Some scholars, following a 
rational choice approach, have even gone as far as to argue that 
individuals cannot have trust in institutions: the expectation of 
reciprocity is the basis of trust and, therefore, we should not 
anticipate institutions to meet our individual expectations [23]. 
Those scholars welcome the steady decline in the levels of 
public trust in government, over the last thirty years, as a sign of 
healthy rationalisation of the public. However, recent trends in 
public trust following the 9/11 in the United States disprove that 
model by highlighting the importance of non-rational factors. 
Furthermore, the various effects of mistrust in the quality of life 
have been well-documented [5]. Therefore, the development of 
qualified trust is vital for civic engagement and democracy. 
 
In summary, engagement constitutes of - or interacts with - 
motivation, political education and trust. These are all 
prerequisites for the transformation of internet access into 
meaningful civic engagement. Again, the facilitation of those 
key elements requires a combination of political, institutional, 
cultural and technical measures. 
 
 
4. DELIBERATION 
 
It could be argued that the ability to express one's opinions and 
ideas, however marginal those may be, is important. In that 
sense, the fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned above 
would be a step forward. Indeed, scholars such as Mitra [24] 
have demonstrated how virtuality challenges the hierarchy of 
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the dominant and the marginal, since it eliminates the 
distinction between centre and periphery. The structure of 
cyberspace, or rather the lack of any structure online, facilitates 
the re-negotiation of identities - individual and collective [25]. 
In addition, new technologies can accelerate civic awareness 
and mobilisation around issues, causes and social movements 
leading to the growth of civic activism [26], [27]. The 
empowerment of individual citizens and movements, the 
facilitation of grassroots mobilisation and civic engagement in 
issue politics are important elements of the liberal and pluralist 
democratic models.  
 
However, if we accept that democracy is more than mere 
preference measurement, participation in elite-defined referenda 
and elections, and contribution to lobbying campaigns, then 
dialogue becomes a vital part of the process. Gastil and Dillard 
[28] found that "deliberation can increase the sophistication of 
citizens' political opinions, and the value of such a change is 
considerable". Furthermore, Price, Cappella and Nir [29] concur 
about the 'value of disagreement' and find that "exposure to [it] 
does indeed contribute to people's ability to generate reasons, 
and in particular reasons why others might disagree with their 
own views". The value of civic dialogue is of obvious 
importance to the deliberative model of democracy. However, 
other mainstream democratic theories, such as 
communitarianism and direct democracy also base their 
contributions on the foundation of rational discussion: 
deliberation is at the heart of communities; while direct 
participation in decision-making requires a very clear and 
comprehensive knowledge of the issues involved (otherwise 
radical democracy could degenerate into the tyranny of the 
masses). 
 
Therefore, deliberation is an integral part of meaningful civic 
engagement and the internet offers an infinite amount of virtual 
spaces within which such discussion can take place, from emails 
and listserves to Internet Relay Chat (IRC) to Usenet 
newsgroups, Bulletin Board Systems and instant messengers. 
However, two specific problems have been identified that may 
affect the quality of deliberation. The first problem is the 
potential lack of disagreement because of the polarisation of 
like-minded individuals into cyber-ghettos. That problem has 
been identified as 'homophily', i.e. the tendency of people to 
look for and fragment into groups of like-minded individuals. If 
proven true that would mean that new technologies facilitate the 
clustering of people into homogeneous interest groups rather 
than make them face each other. However, Stromer-Galley [30] 
raises doubts about the accuracy of the homophily and 
fragmentation thesis and indicates increased diversity of opinion 
within online spaces. 
 
The second problem occurs at the other extreme, i.e. when 
diversity is stretched to become abusive behaviour or what is 
commonly known in computer-mediated communication studies 
as 'flaming' [31]. Flaming is the uncivil and disruptive attitude 
of individuals within online fora, message boards etc due to the 
anonymous and user-friendly nature of the medium (see for 
example the study of Usenet newsgroups by Hill and Hughes 
[32]). These practices undermine the quality of the debate and 
hinder the production of meaningful outcomes relating to the 
substance of issues and policies. Although these activities could 
be seen as part of a distinct sub-culture emerging online (which 
has been defined as 'cyber-conflict' [33]) and as being a part of 
political tactics amongst socio-political and ethno-religious 
groups, flaming has a detrimental effect on the utility of 
unmoderated virtual spaces.  
 
Scholars analysing civic networks and online fora have noted 
that some form of gatekeeping is necessary in order to protect 
the smooth functioning of those spaces. Tambini [34] argues 
that the new media can have a significant effect on the 
enhancement of citizenship through appropriate regulation. 
Dahlberg (e.g. [35]) attributes the success of Minnesota E-
Democracy to features such as the formalisation of rules and the 
careful management of the forum, which underlines the 
importance of a well-structured and well-managed space. These 
accounts concur with Murray's findings from a Markle 
Foundation-sponsored 'hyperforum'; Murray concludes that for 
meaningful deliberation a strong and interactive facilitator is 
necessary and that "[u]ncontrolled, open public participation in 
a hyperforum seems infeasible… because there would not be a 
cohesive sponsoring and participating community" [36]. It is 
interesting that while the new media is liberating us from the 
restrictions and editorial controls of the old media, a structure of 
gatekeeping and agenda-setting needs to be negotiated so as to 
moderate online behaviour, enhance the quality of deliberation 
and ensure the utility and sustainability of a forum. 
 
Apart from homophily and flaming, another issue which has 
been often mentioned as an obstacle for cyberspace becoming a 
democratic public sphere is the pattern of inequality in 
participation evident amongst newsgroup or forum contributors. 
Schneider, among others, found 'extreme' concentration of 
participation among few contributors [37], but this can be 
attributed more to the Pareto law (power law distribution, [38] 
rather than to a weakness of the medium. Referring to similar 
patterns in weblogs, Shirky explains that "[i]n systems where 
many people are free to choose between many options, a small 
subset of the whole will get a disproportionate amount of traffic 
(or attention, or income)…The very act of choosing, spread 
widely enough and freely enough, creates a power law 
distribution" [38]. Hence, although this phenomenon casts a 
shadow over the utopian image of an egalitarian virtual public 
sphere, it does not constitute a situation for which a solution 
needs to be manufactured. 
 
  
5. IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY 
 
The fulfilment of the conditions of access, engagement and 
deliberation would equal a significant move towards a more 
meaningful use of new technologies for the enhancement of 
citizenship and democracy. At that stage, the formation of a 
social consensus might be possible, while individual citizens 
would develop their civic education and critical thinking. Still, 
ethical and practical reasons dictate that the result of this civic 
contribution should materialise into public policy. Unless a link 
is established between the (online) public dialogue and the 
(offline) public policy then citizens could feel what Papacharissi 
called a 'false sense of empowerment' [39]. The problem is 
purely political and is part of a broader pattern that has been 
well documented in the political communication literature, i.e. 
the growth of asymmetrical communication that flows one-way 
from the political leadership to the public via old and new 
media with an increased emphasis on image and presentation. In 
academic and political circles 'political communication' has 
come to connote persuasion (or 'spin'), while for the lay citizen 
it probably does not mean anything anyway. As Coleman notes 
(referring to the use of the internet by politicians) what is 
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missing is "any notion of a relationship between public input 
and policy output" [40]. 
 
Apart from the ethical grounds - of political legitimisation - 
there are also practical reasons for establishing a relationship 
between civic engagement and decision-making. It has been 
shown that the narrowing of the gap between governance and 
citizenship can have great operational benefits for the 
management of difficult projects, crises and natural disasters 
[7]. Therefore, the fourth and final prerequisite for the 
maximum use of the internet for citizenship would be an 
institutional process of feedback between governance and 
citizenship, a channel of public participation in one or more of 
the public policy stages (design, implementation, assessment). 
What differentiates a formal (or institutional) process of 
citizenship from all other civic activities online would be the 
guarantee of equal accessibility for all citizens and affected 
parties. E-consultation could constitute one of the ways to 
institutionalise citizenship online, given that it combines both 
the provision of detailed information on the policies involved 
(thus promoting rational-critical decision-making) and the open 
access for all citizens and affected parties.  
 
However, the logistics of such a project could limit its scale. 
Combining all four requirements in order to produce public 
policy 'baptised' in inclusive and rational civic input might only 
be achieved consistently at the local / community / 
neighbourhood level. The complexity and detail of the issues 
involved, the need to include all affected parties (or to give 
them the right to be included if they wish so), the necessity of 
relevant and efficient public contributions, while keeping to 
limited resources, means that there could well be a limit to what 
the internet can offer to institutional citizenship, at least in the 
foreseeable future. Obviously, that definition excludes 
numerous less formal opportunities and contributions, such as 
awareness of global issues, mobilisation and activism through 
NGOs and pressure groups, discussion at a private/non-formal 
setting, individual action and support of causes etc. These 
activities are, arguably, equally or more important for an 
individual's civic engagement and can have a great empowering 
effect on the citizen, on the groups and movements affected, or 
on the society / government involved. But the democratic 
character of online civic activities should be reinforced through 
the introduction of minimum provisions guaranteeing the equal 
availability of these processes to all citizens who wish to access 
them. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON E-
CITIZENSHIP 
 
Having considered a variety of issues, arguments and empirical 
data, four factors emerge affecting the democratic character of 
online civic engagement: access to the new technologies 
(including the narrow definition of entry into the virtual sphere 
and the broader sense of understanding the IT culture); 
engagement with the process (influenced by political education, 
motivation and trust); meaningful and civil deliberation with 
people from diverse backgrounds and of different opinions; and, 
finally, a link between civic input and public policy output. 
Although it is undeniable that partial fulfilment of some or all of 
these conditions can have positive effects for the inclusion of 
more citizens in the political process and the reduction of the 
democratic deficit, it could also lead to asymmetric 
empowerment or disempowerment of specific citizen groups, if 
that asymmetry is disproportionately evident amongst specific 
population groups.  
 
In their analysis, Kurland and Egan [14] present a series of 
educational, cultural and economical barriers obstructing the 
generation of civic engagement online, ranging from IT skills 
and resources to self-regulation to gender to deliberation skills. 
Even if these barriers were to be overcome, and the four 
conditions were met, there would still be the issue of scale. The 
logistics and complexities of contemporary policy-making and 
public administration processes mean that, in order to have a 
meaningful communication between citizenship and 
governance, the space within which issues are discussed and 
decisions are made should be finite. The bigger the scale, the 
more difficult it is to ensure universal access, meaningful 
engagement (including political education), meaningful 
deliberation and impact on public policy. That, in turn, requires 
the setting of boundaries of some sort, i.e. the line between 
those included in and those excluded from that process. At the 
moment, the only reasonable and democratic criterion by which 
this division could happen is locality (i.e. excluding some 
citizens from the policy-making process according, for example, 
to the policy area involved would be very contentious).  
 
Thus, despite the collapse of space and time in the online world, 
and the global nature of current issues, a locus operandi seems 
to be the sine qua non of democratic engagement. This 
proposition concurs with empirical analyses into online civic 
engagement; Tambini argues that "it is the local experiments - 
the so-called 'civic networks' - that are most advanced, and offer 
the clearest insights into emerging patterns of political 
communication" [34].  
 
In addition to the issue of scale, there is another operational 
requirement that emerges as vital but contentious; that is the 
issue of control, i.e. gatekeeping. There is an emerging 
consensus in the literature that some form of social control is 
necessary if there is to be meaningful interaction of citizens. It 
is too early to say whether that could happen via self-regulation, 
although the anonymity and accessibility of the internet makes 
that very difficult. Once gatekeeping has been accepted as 
necessary, all sorts of questions about agenda-setting, framing, 
manipulation, centre v. periphery and the dominant v. the 
marginal emerge.  
 
The tensions and problems raised by both requirements of a 
locus operandi and a modus operandi for online citizenship 
mirror similar questions that have already been raised offline. 
The management of these tensions and the negotiation of rules 
that ensure inclusive but effective civic engagement online rests 
upon the will of political leaders and citizens, rather than the 
technology itself. 
 
In conclusion, although the internet contributes to the creation 
of new forms of citizenship and empowerment, the equal 
distribution of those resources to the citizens require the 
fulfilment of four conditions (access, engagement, deliberation, 
impact on public policy) and the negotiation of two operational 
requirements (finite space, social control). The realities and 
logistics of those prerequisites mean that in the foreseeable 
future the internet will not replace offline modes of citizenship, 
but rather that it will complement them. The prevention of new 
forms of social exclusion and asymmetric empowerment 
requires the political reinforcement of democratic citizenship, 
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through the universal provision of institutional and cultural 
resources. 
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